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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2019, Governor Gavin Newsome of California signed a bill
barring the state’s department of corrections from entering into or renewing
contracts with private corporations to run state prisons and immigrant
detention centers beginning January 1, 2020. 1 Citing a lack of oversight and
*Katherine Rollins, J.D. Candidate 2021 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author is
a second-year, first generation law student whose parents instilled in her a passion for
progressivism. She is grateful for the unwavering support from all the people in her life and
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an improper weighing of profit maximization over livable conditions,
California will completely ban the incarceration of inmates in privately-run
facilities from 2028 onward. 2 Of the 9,000 individuals currently detained in
California’s privately-run facilities, approximately 4,000 are immigrants in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention. 3 Illinois, Nevada,
and New York imposed bans similar to California’s. 4 It is estimated that as
many as seventy-three percent of immigration detainees are housed in
privately-run facilities nationally. 5 This means that the beneficial impact of
this legislation will mostly be seen by immigrant communities.
While state legislatures battle with the legality of private immigrant
detention centers, this article proposes an expansion and strengthening of
federal whistleblower protections to increase oversight and improve
conditions at the remaining facilities nationwide. Part II discusses the history
of immigrant detention in the United States and the impact of detention on
short-term and long-term detainees. Part III analyzes the standards and
current oversight mechanisms applicable to immigrant detention centers
and proposes that—in addition to legislation specifically aimed at improving
detention center standards—whistleblower reform generally will help to
protect the civil liberties of detainees. Finally, Part IV looks to the future of
immigrant detention centers and the United States’ influence on global
immigration policy.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Immigration detention in the United States is not new. 6 Throughout
our country’s history, and up to present day, pressure from nationalist
movements has led to exclusionary immigration laws and high detention
for the attorneys, activists, and community members fighting for the rights of immigrants
every day. The author thanks Professor Pottratz Acosta for her guidance and mentorship.
Prior to joining Mitchell Hamline as an Assistant Teaching Professor, Professor Pottratz
Acosta worked in immigration law for twelve years.
Steve Gorman, California Bans Private Prisons and Immigration Detention Centers,
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-prisons/californiabans-private-prisons-and-immigration-detention-centers-idUSKBN1WQ2Q9
[https://perma.cc/UCW5-YP4T].
1

2
3
4

Id.
Id.
Id.

THE SENTENCING PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/private-prisons-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/B9S4-EYLP]. By comparison, inmates in state and federal privately-run
prisons amounted for only about 8.2% of the total prison population. Id.
See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 5 (4th ed. 2016).

5

6
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rates. 7 Starting as early as the second half of the nineteenth century, the
United States government has singled out and precluded groups of people
from entering the country based on arbitrary ideas of who is worthy enough
to reside in our country—let alone participate in our democracy. 8

A. The History of Immigrant Detention
The first federal restrictions on immigration arose in the nineteenth
century after the Civil War and provided for the exclusion of convicts and
sex workers. 9 Following an increase in immigration from Asia, Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, 10 the Public Charge Law of 1882, 11 and
the Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885 as part of an expansive effort to curb
migration from that part of the world. 12 After the turn of the century, more
than twenty million immigrants came to the United States looking for work,
led by the development of industry in American cities. 13 With another influx
of immigrants also came additional legislation categorically restricting
immigration on the basis of ideology, nationality, health, and mental
disabilities. 14

1. Ellis Island
Ellis Island, known as the “Golden Door” 15 to the United States, was
both an institution that welcomed immigrants processed there and a
detention center for those who were unlucky enough to fall into any of the

See id.; Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 200 (2019) (“The Trump Administration’s immigration policies
reflect its white nationalist rhetoric. The Administration has issued a dizzying array of policy
changes that explicitly target or disproportionately affect noncitizens of color at the same time
that President Trump’s statements reflect racist intent.”).
Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 7, at 200.
BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 5; Page Law, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974).
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
Public Charge Law, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882). This law also excluded “any convict,
lunatic, [or] idiot . . . .” Id.
See Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885); see also Louis Anthes,
The Island of Duty: The Practice of Immigration Law on Ellis Island, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 563, 569 (1998).
See BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 6.
Id. at 6, n.25.
See Emma Goldman, Immigration and Deportation at Ellis Island, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/goldman-immigration-anddeportation-ellis-island/ [https://perma.cc/T3PG-QW3K] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020).
7

8
9

10
11

12

13
14
15
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restricted categories of persons at the time. 16 First opened in 1892, Ellis
Island operated, though intermittently, until 1954. 17
Initially, Ellis Island was an enforcement tool for federal statutes
enacted in the prior decade and this enforcement power was later
strengthened by the Immigration Act of 1891 and the creation of the Bureau
of Immigration. 18 The Immigration Act of 1891 not only created additional
restrictions on who could enter the United States but also provided for the
inspection of immigrants upon their arrival to the United States. 19 Inspection
officers were “to take and consider testimony touching the right of any such
aliens to enter the United States, all of which shall be entered of record.” 20
While a seemingly straightforward directive, together the Public Charge Law
of 1882 and the Anti-Contract Labor Law of 1885 created contradictory
admission standards for entry into the United States. The Public Charge
Law prohibited “any person unable to take care of himself or herself without
becoming a public charge,” 21 while the Anti-Contract Labor Law made it:
unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation .
. . [to] in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration
of any alien or aliens . . . under contract or agreement . . . made
previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens,
foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in
the United States . . . . 22
In effect, hopeful immigrants were confronted with a contradictory
situation: they had to demonstrate they could both support themselves
See History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV.: ELLIS ISLAND (last updated May 8, 2018),
https://www.nps.gov/elis/learn/historyculture/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/KXM7-4HDJ]
(“For the vast majority of immigrants, Ellis Island truly was an ‘Island of Hope’—the first stop
on their way to new opportunities and experiences in America. For the rest, it became an
‘Island of Tears’—a place where families were separated and individuals were denied entry
into to the United States.”); Ellis Island History, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY-ELLIS ISLAND
FOUND., https://www.libertyellisfoundation.org/ellis-island-history [https://perma.cc/4KT9DHTJ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (“First and second class passengers would disembark,
pass through Customs at the piers and were free to enter the United States. The steerage and
third-class passengers were transported from the pier by ferry or barge to Ellis Island where
everyone would undergo a medical and legal inspection.”).
See id. The facility was closed for three years after a fire in 1897, and again during World
War I when it was used by the United States military. Id.
See Kevin Jennings, Yes, Your Ancestors Probably Did Come Here Legally—Because
‘Illegal’ Immigration is Less Than a Century Old, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-jennings-legal-illegal-immigration-20180114story.html [https://perma.cc/FF5U-M3PX].
Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 (1891).
16

17

18

19
20

Id.

21

Public Charge Law, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
Anti-Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885).

22
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financially (or be supported by relatives) and that they did not have a job,
and therefore a source of income, prearranged. 23 Those that failed the
inspection process were detained until an exclusion hearing was held by the
Board of Special Inquiry. 24 Evidence collected by inspectors created a
presumption in favor of exclusion, but immigrants could present new, and
even directly contradictory evidence, to overcome that presumption. 25
Overall, about twenty percent of those inspected at Ellis Island were
temporarily detained. 26 While the Immigration Act of 1891 provided that
detainees are “to be properly housed, fed, and cared for,” 27 over 3,500
immigrants died in the hospital on the island. 28 After the passage of the
Emergency Quota Act of 1921 29 and the Immigration Act of 1924, 30 the
number of immigrants processed through Ellis Island slowed to a trickle,
and the facility eventually transitioned into a detention center for prisoners
of war in World War II. 31

2. Angel Island
On the other side of the country in San Francisco, hopeful immigrants
had a much different experience. 32 Angel Island opened in 1910 to primarily
house Chinese immigrants awaiting inspection. 33 Separated by nationality,
travel class, and perceived health, poor and Asian migrants were taken from
the passenger ships to Angel Island for processing and to await interviews
See Anthes, supra note 12, at 574.
See id. at 580.
Cf. id. at 581. Interestingly, the immigrants who appealed to the Board of Special Inquiry
without hiring representation fared better than those who did hire representation. See id. at
23
24
25

583. Anthes analyzed 424 cases before the Board and found that unrepresented immigrants
won about three-fifths of their cases, while represented immigrants only won about two-fifths
of the time. Id.
Goldman, supra note 15.
Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1085 (1891).
Caitlin Johnson, Remembering the Dark Side of Ellis Island, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2007),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remembering-the-dark-side-of-ellis-island/
[https://perma.cc/KJ8E-BN3E].
Emergency Quota Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, 5 (1921) (“[T]he number of aliens of any nationality
who may be admitted under the immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall
be limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident
in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910.”).
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (establishing consular processing and
further restricting immigration on the basis of national origin).
See Goldman, supra note 15.
History of Angel Island Immigration Station, AIISF, https://www.aiisf.org/history
[https://perma.cc/TQ9Q-KSDW] (last visited Mar. 21, 2020).
26
27
28

29

30

31
32

33

Id.
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with federal officials, which were more like interrogations. 34 Some interviews
lasted days, testing applicants’ knowledge of the intimate details of their
lives, and were meant to root out and deport Chinese immigrants who lied
about meeting the criteria for exempt status under the Chinese Exclusion
Act. 35 Inconsistencies in testimony could put both the applicant and any of
his or her family members in the United States at risk of being deported. 36
While the exact numbers relating to immigrant detention at Angel
Island are unknown (the Administration Building, along with all of its
records, burned down in 1940), 37 it has been estimated that the average
length of detention for all arrivals in San Francisco (including those who
were not sent to Angel Island at all) was 7.1 nights. 38 Living conditions at
Angel Island were poor, as detainees were denied anything more than
minimal recreation time and fed rations that were “barely edible.” 39 The
poor conditions in the barracks were evidenced by the poems etched into
the wooden walls. 40 One detainee wrote:
Imprisoned in the wooden building day after day,
My freedom withheld; how can I bear to talk about it?
I look to see who is happy, but they only sit quietly.
I am anxious and depressed and cannot fall asleep.
The days are long and the bottle constantly empty;
my sad mood, even so, is not dispelled.
34
35

Id.
Id.; Exclusion of Chinese Laborers Act, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476, 476 (1888) (repealed 1943)

(“Chinese officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure or curiosity, shall
be permitted to enter the United States, but in order to entitle themselves to do so, they shall
first obtain the permission of the Chinese Government, or other Government of which they
may at the time be citizens or subjects.”). Exclusionary policies continued through the turn
of the century and included the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, in which the
United States government “agreed to pressure the San Francisco authorities to withdraw the
measure, and the Japanese Government promised to restrict the immigration of laborers to
the United States.” Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900–1922,
OFF.
OF
THE
HISTORIAN,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(2016),
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations
[https://perma.cc/45J3ZRY6]; see also Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 875–76 (1917) (providing
that “the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States
. . . unless otherwise provided for by existing treaties, persons who are natives of islands not
possessed by the United States adjacent to the Continent of Asia . . . or who are natives of
any country, province, or dependency situate on the Continent of Asia . . . .”).
AIISF, supra note 32.
36
37

Id.

Robert Barde & Gustavo J. Bobonis, Detention at Angel Island: First Empirical Evidence,
30 SOC. SCI. HIST. 103, 113 (2006).
AIISF, supra note 32.
38

39
40

Id.
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Nights are long and the pillow cold; who can pity my loneliness?
After experiencing such loneliness and sorrow,
Why not just return home and learn to plow the fields? 41
Despite the fire in 1940, Angel Island was still used to detain
immigrants during World War II. 42 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many
Japanese immigrants living in Hawaii were sent to the mainland; about 600
of those individuals were detained at Angel Island and labeled as “enemy
aliens.” 43 After the war ended, the detention center was abandoned by the
United States’ military and remained that way until it was established as a
California state park. 44

3. The Switch from Parole to Detention
From the closure of Ellis Island in 1954 until the early 1980s, the
federal government generally opted for alternatives to detention of
immigrants. 45 “Physical detention of aliens [was then] the exception, not the
rule, and [was] generally employed only as to security risks or those likely
to abscond.” 46 One of the most commonly used alternatives at the time—
parole—is defined as “a device that allows a person’s physical admission to
the United States, yet treats the person in a legal sense as if he or she were
still at the border seeking admission.” 47 While parole is a form of statutory
41

Unknown Author, Poem 43, in ISLAND: POETRY AND HISTORY OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS
of Washington Press 2d ed. 2014).
AIISF, supra note 32.

ON ANGEL ISLAND, 1910–1940 68 (University
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
See IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1955 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1955) (“The total

number of aliens detained during the year was only 184,000, of which 173,000 were Mexican
nationals who were detained for extremely brief periods pending their return to Mexico.”);
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1960) (“6,694 aliens were
taken into custody under warrants of arrest. . . . At the end of the fiscal year, 6,976 aliens
under proceedings were on bond, supervision, or released on their own recognizance.”);
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1965) (“There were 17,041
aliens initially admitted to Service detention facilities and 29,918 to non-Service facilities.”);
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1970) (“There were 94,053
aliens initially admitted to Service detention facilities and 121,670 to non-Service facilities.”);
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1975) (“Aliens admitted to
Service and non-Service facilities during fiscal year 1975 numbered 109,138 and 103,888
respectively.”); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1982)
(“During this period, 229,135 aliens were admitted in detention: 143,616 to these INS
facilities and 85,519 to non-Service facilities.”).
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (holding that immigration parole is
merely used to avoid needless detention of immigrants and does not constitute a change in
status).
BOSWELL, supra note 6, at 11 n.48; see id. at 36; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
46

47
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relief still available today, it is a discretionary decision left up to the attorney
general. 48

a. Haitian and Cuban Migration and the Federal Government’s
“Solution”
Starting in the early 1970s, Haitians began making their way to Florida
in order to escape a repressive dictatorship. 49 At that time, refugee status was
primarily granted only to those fleeing communist governments. 50 The
Refugee Act of 1980, however, expanded the definition of “refugee” to align
with the 1951 U.N. Convention 51 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 52 allowing for a grant of conditional status for individuals
“who [are] unable or unwilling to return to [their country] because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 53
However, to circumvent the newly enacted law and to deter further
migration from Haiti, the federal government began by first classifying those
fleeing the Haitian Duvalier regime as economic migrants, making them
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). After the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the discretion to parole now also lies with DHS and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit
Parole for Individuals Outside the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVS. (last updated Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-orsignificant-public-benefit-parole-individuals-outside-united-states [https://perma.cc/NDB3VYDR].
GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DETENTION POLICIES AFFECTING
HAITIAN NATIONALS 1 (June 16, 1983); Carl Lindskoog, How the Haitian Refugee Crisis
Led to the Indefinite Detention of Immigrants, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/04/09/how-the-haitianrefugee-crisis-led-to-the-indefinite-detention-of-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4R-SQ2S].
See Immigration and Nationality Act, amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 913
(1965). This amendment also provided for conditional status for individuals fleeing “the
general area of the Middle East.”
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545
(“[T]he term refugee shall apply to any person who: . . . As a result of events occurring before
1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country . . . .”).
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791
(expanding the definition of refugee to individuals persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion after January 1,
1951).
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980).
48

49

50

51

52

53
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ineligible for asylum. 54 In contrast, after thousands of Cubans sought asylum
in the Peruvian embassy in Cuba, President Jimmy Carter invited them to
seek refuge in the United States. 55 In the summer of 1980, the relatively
gradual influx of migrants grew into a crisis as more than 100,000 Cuban
and 15,000 Haitian nationals arrived in the United States. 56 Newcomers
were held in detention centers, which were established by the Carter
administration, while they were processed. 57 The majority of Cubans were
released on parole after processing, while the remaining were held to await
deportation. 58 Haitians, on the other hand, were deemed to lack ties to the
community and, for the most part, remained in detention. 59 During this time
period, approximately 1,620 immigrants were held in detention daily. 60
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan started a program meant to deter
illegal immigration, part of which “provided for detention of aliens involved
in or awaiting exclusion proceedings as [a] means of restricting employment
opportunities.” 61 The change in policy led to “critical” overcrowding at
detention centers in South Florida. 62 At one infamous facility, Krome North,
as many as 1,530 detainees were housed in a space meant for 524 people. 63
An Immigration and Naturalization Service official noticed substantial
See Lindskoog, supra note 49.
Yvette M. Mastin, Comment, Sentenced to Purgatory: The Indefinite Detention of Mariel
Cubans, 2 THE SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 137, 142–43 (2000). As
54
55

a result of the invitation, Fidel Castro opened Cuba’s borders to allow Cubans to travel to
the United States. Id. at 143. After thousands of Cubans began their journey to southern
Florida, “the Mariel Cubans became the victims of a propaganda campaign that made them
appear dangerous and undesirable.” Id. at 144. Despite reports that many of the Mariel
Cubans were “convicts, robbers, murders, homosexuals and prostitutes,” the large majority
were paroled to families or other support groups. Id. at 145, 146. Yet, the nation’s view of
these immigrants remained largely negative, resulting in the continued detention of excluded
Cubans “to await further evaluation.” Id. at 146.
56
57
58

Id.
See Lindskoog, supra note 49.
See Mastin, supra note 55, at 144. Another example of the preferential treatment of Cubans

included the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which allowed admitted Cuban nationals to
apply for lawful permanent residence status after residing in the United States for just one
year. See Cuban Refugees, Adjustment of Status Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat.
1161, 1161 (1966).
GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6 (“Haitian nationals
were disproportionately affected by the detention action—in terms of both the numbers
detained and the length of detention.”).
See Emily Kassie, Detained, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/24/detained [https://perma.cc/W6ES-XASH].
GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49, at 6.
See id. at 18.
59

60

61
62
63

Id.
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issues in living conditions at Krome North, including an inadequate supply
of clothing, inoperable washing machines due to sewage capacity,
“debilitating idleness,” “severe” dental problems, and lack of shade. 64
Detainees were affected physically and mentally, as noted by Red Cross
representatives who “concluded that mental disorders [were] one of the
principal medical problems” detainees faced, and these “problems were a
factor of the length of confinement and could not be resolved by improved
detention conditions.” 65 The daily average number of immigrants subject to
these conditions reached 2,868 in 1982. 66

b. The Cold War by Proxy and Resulting Migration
Ever worried about the spread of Marxism, the Reagan administration
provided support to the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala fighting
a leftist movement and to the contra rebels in Nicaragua fighting against the
socialist Frente Sandinista. 67 As a result, the increasingly violent civil wars led
an estimated one million Central Americans to make the journey to the
United States. 68 Declining to label the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan
governments as violators of human rights (and therefore labeling the United
States as a human rights violator by proxy), the Justice Department and the
INS overwhelmingly denied asylum to Salvadorans and Guatemalans. 69
Instead, Central American migrants arrested at the United States-Mexico
border were detained, pressured into voluntarily departing, or were
deported without access to legal services. 70
In an attempt to deal with the overcrowding and pressure from
lobbyists, the Reagan administration sought help from the new private
prison industry to open and run additional immigrant detention centers. 71
The United States’ first privately-run immigrant detention center opened in
Texas in 1984 and was owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation
64
65
66
67

Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 20–21.
See Kassie, supra note 60.
See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION

POLICY
INST.:
MIGRATION
INFO.
SOURCE
(Apr.
1,
2006),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-reagan-era
[https://perma.cc/9FTL-RG82].
68
69

Id.
Id. (“[A]pproval rates for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases were under three

percent in 1984. In the same year, the approval rate for Iranians was sixty percent, forty
percent for Afghans fleeing the Soviet invasion, and thirty-two percent for Poles.”)
70

Id.

71

Michael Flynn, There and Back Again: On the Diffusion of Immigration Detention, 2 J.
165, 171 (2014).

ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY
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of America. 72 That same year, the daily average number of immigrants held
in detention reached 3,380. 73

c. The War on Drugs
President Richard Nixon declared a “war on drugs” in 1971, but it was
not until the rise of the Medellin cartel and the election of President Reagan
that the war on drugs truly ramped up. 74 First Lady Nancy Reagan
introduced her “Just Say No” campaign in 1984, and two years later,
President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 75 In addition to
the bill’s arguably most controversial provision, which established
mandatory minimum sentences, it expanded the drug-related offenses that
could result in a finding of inadmissibility or deportability. 76 Moreover, the
bill also enabled local law enforcement to communicate with INS if it
believed it had arrested a non-citizen for a drug-related offense. 77
Id. at 171 n.8. The Corrections Corporation of America is still in business today, renamed
CoreCivic—one of the largest private detention companies in the country. See Smita Ghosh,
How Migrant Detention Became American Policy, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/19/how-migrant-detention-becameamerican-policy/ [https://perma.cc/YYG2-386M].
See Kassie, supra note 60.
See Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NPR (Apr. 2, 2007),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 [https://perma.cc/BMN3VJ3T].
Id.; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
100 Stat. 3207 at 47. Grounds of inadmissibility apply to individuals who are seeking to
enter the United States at a border or port of entry, and to those who are looking to adjust
their immigration status, like when applying for a “green card.” See BOSWELL, supra note 6,
at 30–31. Grounds of deportability, on the other hand, apply when a noncitizen has been
formally admitted to the United States and may face removal to their country of origin. Id.
at 30.
Section 1751 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides:
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law
enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances,
if the official (or another official)—(1) has reason to believe that the alien may
not have been lawfully admitted to the United States or otherwise is not lawfully
present in the United States, (2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or
employee of the Service authorized and designated by the Attorney General of
the arrest and of facts concerning the status of the alien, and (3) requests the
Service to determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer to detain the
alien, the officer of employee of the Service shall promptly determine whether
or not to issue such a detainer. If such a detainer is issued and the alien is not
otherwise detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney General
shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien.
100 Stat. 3207 at 47–48.
72

73
74

75
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Further escalating the impact of the drug war on immigrants, the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 mandated detention of non-citizens convicted of
an aggravated felony, which at the time was defined as “murder, any drug
trafficking crime . . . or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive
devices . . . .” 78 This “aggravated felony” rule not only applied to
undocumented immigrants, but to individuals who were in the United States
legally. 79 After serving their criminal sentences, these immigrants were then
taken into custody by immigration officials. 80
With more enforcement, the population of detainees continued to
grow, and it expanded faster than the federal government could build livable
detention facilities and hire adequate personnel. 81 In 1989, the average daily
population of immigrants in INS custody reached 6,438. 82 As a result,
detention centers started using tent-like structures to house immigrants, and
reports of abuse by INS and private security officers in detention facilities
were not uncommon. 83

4. The Passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA)
Between 1988 and 1996, new immigration laws were marketed as
focusing on increasing opportunities for legal immigration. The
Immigration Act of 1990, for example, increased the quota numbers for
employment-based and family-based immigration, and it created the visa
program for highly skilled workers and the diversity visa lottery that is still
in use today. 84 This law also granted Temporary Protected Status for
Salvadoran nationals living in the United States. 85 Up to this point, noncitizens with a final removal order could not be detained longer than six
months. 86 Yet, after the passage of the 1990 law, non-citizens labeled as
“aggravated felons” were exempt from this six-month limit. 87 However, antiAnti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181, § 7342 (1988).
Id. (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted of an aggravated
felony upon completion of the alien’s sentence for such conviction.” (emphasis added)).
78
79

80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
See Kassie, supra note 60.
Id.
See id.
See 27 Pub. L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978, 4986–5001 (1990).
Id. at 5036–38.
See Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies,

ACLU,
(2020)
https://www.aclu.org/other/analysis-immigration-detention-policies [https://perma.cc/FVB4JFX3]. Unless the detainee was obstructing deportation, they had to be released under
supervision after this six-month limit was reached. Id.
Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990).

86

87
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immigrant sentiment continued to spread, especially after the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, 88 as shown by California’s passage of Proposition
187. 89
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law what would become the
groundwork for the immigrant detention apparatus that we have today. 90
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 91 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) 92
greatly expanded the use of detention for immigrants by broadening the
definition of “aggravated felony” and by introducing the expedited removal
process. 93 Prior to the passage of IIRAIRA, an average of 6,785 immigrants
were held in detention daily. 94 Just after the passage of IIRAIRA, however,
the daily number of immigrants in detention nearly doubled to 11,871, and

See Kassie, supra note 60. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing killed six people, and
more than 1,000 were injured. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts, CNN
(updated Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-centerbombing-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/M5QP-TDF4].
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (1995) (“The
initiative’s provisions require law enforcement, social services, health care and public
education personnel to (i) verify the immigration status of persons with whom they come in
contact; (ii) notify certain defined persons of their immigration status; (iii) report those
persons to state and federal officials; and (iv) deny those persons social services, health care,
and education.”). Proposition 187 passed by a vote of 59 percent to 41 percent. Id.
See
Mandatory
Detention,
DETENTION
WATCH
NETWORK,
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/mandatory-detention
[https://perma.cc/GK36-6XMF] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1271 (1996) (“If the [asylum] officer determines at
the time of the interview that an alien has a credible fear of persecution . . . the alien shall be
detained for an asylum hearing before an asylum officer under section 208.” (emphasis
added)).
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-585 (1996) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who—(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
212(a)(2), (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
237(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), (C) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) on
the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of
at least 1 year, or (D) is inadmissible under 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section
237(a)(4)(B), when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on
parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be
arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” (emphasis added)).
See DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, supra note 90.
Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal
Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 6 (Sept.
2009); cf. Immigration Detention 101, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK,
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101
[https://perma.cc/5SM6XGD8] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
88

89

90

91

92

93
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continued to rise. 95 In addition to an increase in detainees generally, the
average length of detention also increased, as migrants whose country from
whence they came would not accept them back were held indefinitely. 96
More detainees also fell into this expanded definition of “aggravated felon,”
making them exempt from the six-month limit on detention. 97 In order to
implement IIRAIRA, the INS had to work quickly to increase the capacity
of immigrant detention and began relying heavily on private prison
companies. 98
Yet, there did appear to be some public pushback on these restrictive
policies. In the summer of 2001, the United States Supreme Court found
that holding immigrants in detention indefinitely raised serious
constitutional concerns. 99 This decision, while meaningful at the time, would
prove to be construed narrowly, applying only to migrants who had been
ordered deported but did not have a country that would accept their
repatriation. 100 Shortly after that decision was issued, the United States would
experience the worst terrorist attack in its history, perpetrated by foreign
nationals who obtained valid visas, leading anti-immigrant sentiment to rise
yet again. 101

5. The Effect of 9/11 on Immigrant Detention Policies
Just as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center impacted
immigration policy, the devastation of 9/11 led to an entire overhaul of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service that oversaw immigration and
immigration enforcement. 102 The first changes to the United States’
immigration system after 9/11 came from the USA PATRIOT Act. 103 This
Act greatly increased the number of border patrol agents and immigration
95
96
97
98
99

Kerwin & Yi-Ying Lin, supra note 94, at 6.
See Kassie, supra note 60.
See ACLU, supra note 86.
Id.
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite

detention of aliens [who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered
removed] would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an
implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court
review.”).

Id.
See Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration
Policy and Program Changes in the Decade Since 9/11, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1 (Aug.

100
101

2011).
102

Id.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
103
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inspectors, led to the creation of an identification verification system for
individuals entering the country, including the use of biometric tools, and
permitted indefinite detention after obtaining a removal order. 104
Immediately following 9/11, and in the name of national security,
immigrant detainees of “high interest” could not contact attorneys, and
those deemed to be of “special interest” were subject to closed deportation
hearings. 105 Furthermore, the INS instituted a policy that allowed for
immigrants to be detained without charge for forty-eight hours, or, if due to
some extraordinary circumstance, for a reasonable period of time. 106 After
determining that al-Qaeda perpetrated the attacks, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), created in 2002, quickly instituted policies that
focused on individuals arriving into the United States from countries where
al-Qaeda was known or rumored to operate. It required men from twentyfour Muslim-majority countries to register with legacy INS or the newly
created DHS. 107 Operation Liberty Shield, for example, while temporary,
mandated the detention of asylum-seekers from such countries. 108
The United States’ Supreme Court upheld many of these new,
seemingly unconstitutional policies, specifically noting that “[i]n the exercise
of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 109 In Demore
v. Kim, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not guarantee
immigrant detainees the right to a bond hearing while awaiting their removal
proceedings. 110 As the dissent in that case points out, however, Kim was a
lawful permanent resident at the time of his detention, and therefore,
“entitled . . . to the safeguards of the Constitution . . . .” 111 Further
complicating the matter is the fact that a substantial number of immigrants
in detention do not have final orders of removal. 112 For example, in June of

104
105
106
107

Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 1; see also Boswell, supra note 6, at 18.
Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7.

Id.
Id. at 6; see National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), ARAB AM. INST.

(2018), https://www.aaiusa.org/nseers [https://perma.cc/N9HY-X46N] (“More than 13,000
men who complied with call-in registration were placed in removal proceedings.” (emphasis
added)).
Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80
(1976)).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 544 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)).
See CARL TAKEI ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHUTTING DOWN THE
PROFITEERS: WHY AND HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SHOULD STOP
USING PRIVATE PRISONS, 15 (Sept. 2016).
108
109

110
111
112
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2016, “more than 25,000 of the 37,000 people in ICE detention” did not
have such orders. 113
Arguably, the largest change after the 9/11 attacks was the creation of
the DHS, a new cabinet-level agency approved by Congress in 2002 through
the passage of the Homeland Security Act. 114 DHS’s focus was national
security, specifically “[p]reventing terrorist attacks and reducing vulnerability
to terrorism in the United States.” 115 With the creation of this agency,
immigration enforcement and administrative functions of the INS, a subagency of the Department of Justice, were transitioned to DHS. 116
Additionally, DHS created three sub-agencies, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
Citizenship and Immigration Services, to manage different immigration
specific missions of the agency. 117 In particular, CBP 118 and ICE 119 are the
enforcement arms of the immigration apparatus, while Citizenship and
Immigration Services handles the administrative arm and is tasked with
“efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits.” 120
The REAL ID Act of 2005 121 is most commonly known by the general
public as having changed the standards for state identification cards. 122
However, it also made substantial changes to judicial review and jurisdiction
in immigration cases. 123 Further, the Act greatly increased the burden on
asylum-seekers to show—not only that they have been or will be persecuted
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

113

Id.

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see also
Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 2.
114

115
116
117
118

Id.
Id.
Id.
See About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Sept. 18, 2019),

https://www.cbp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BK6B-UHWF] (“With more than 60,000
employees, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, is one of the world’s largest law
enforcement organizations and is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of
the U.S. while facilitating lawful international trade and travel.”).
See What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.ice.gov/overview [https://perma.cc/DAQ3-2G3J] (“ICE’s mission is to protect
America from the cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security
and public safety.”).
See About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus [https://perma.cc/8QZG-QUX8].
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23 (2005).
See Mittelstadt, supra note 101, at 7.
119 Stat. at 302–23.
119

120

121
122
123
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social group, or political opinion—but that one of these grounds is the
“central reason” for their persecution. 124

B. The Privatization of Detention Centers
Since the first privately-run facility opened in 1984, the government’s
reliance on private corporations to run the immigrant detention apparatus
has continued to grow. 125 Today, ICE utilizes and contracts with four types
of adult detention facilities: service processing centers, contract detention
facilities, dedicated Intergovernmental Service Agreement facilities, and
non-dedicated ISA facilities. 126 Service processing centers are owned and
operated by ICE. 127 Contract detention facilities are owned and operated by
private corporations that contract with ICE. 128 Both dedicated and nondedicated Intergovernmental Service Agreement facilities are operated by
state or local governments under a contract with ICE, but the state or local
governments may choose to further subcontract out to private
corporations. 129 Additionally, non-dedicated Intergovernmental Service
Agreement facilities may house immigrant detainees with other populations
of detained persons, such as inmates. 130 Today, the majority of immigrants
in detention are housed in facilities operated by private companies. 131 The
increased proportion of immigrants held in privately operated facilities,
combined with the fact that such corporations are for-profit, 132 has led to
increased criticism from immigrant advocacy groups. 133
Id. at 303.
See Livia Luan, Profiting from Enforcement: The Role of Private Prisons in U.S.
Immigration
Detention,
MIGRATION
POLICY
INST.
(May
2,
2018),

124
125

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/profiting-enforcement-role-private-prisons-usimmigration-detention [https://perma.cc/JMH7-LJZD].
JOHN V. KELLY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS
ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION FACILITIES 1 (Dec. 11,
2017),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/OIG-18-32-Dec17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9JU-EH5W].
126

Id.
Id.
See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration
Federalism, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 224, 225–26 (2019).
KELLY, supra note 126, at 1.
See Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention
Data Yet. It’s Alarming., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018),

127
128
129

130
131

https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-immigrationdetention-data-yet [https://perma.cc/QJ2R-5J8M].
See, e.g., CoreCivic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 23, 2017); The GEO Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2016).
See generally TAKEI ET AL., supra note 112.
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Generally, immigration detention facilities are not meant to be punitive
but to provide merely civil detainment as immigrants await admission or
orders of removal. 134 However, most facilities are at least jail-like in nature,
if not actual jails. 135 The two largest private prison companies in the United
States, CoreCivic, Inc. and the GEO Group, Inc., maintain contracts with
ICE and had a combined value of $765 million in revenue as of 2015. 136
Despite the benchmarks these private prison companies agreed to meet,
there is little transparency, and the goal of maximizing profits has often led
to cutting corners, resulting in substandard conditions at many detention
centers around the country. 137

C. Human Rights Abuses at Immigrant Detention Centers
Much of the argument that supports keeping immigrants in custody as
they await their proceedings has to do with public safety. 138 But often, the
individuals making those arguments fail to take into account the safety of
the migrants in detention. 139 Overcrowding in detention centers has led to

Id. at 8.
Id. “With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were built, and
operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons.” Id. (quoting Dora
Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 2–3 (Oct. 6, 2009)).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12–15.
See, e.g., Why Immigration Detention is Necessary, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
134
135

136
137
138

(Jan.
24,
2019),
https://cis.org/Fact-Sheet/Why-Immigration-Detention-Necessary
[https://perma.cc/Y746-PMPX] (“[W]hile aliens [that are merely here illegally] don’t . . .
represent the same kind of risk as alien criminals or national security threats, simply by
volume they pose a real possibility of collapsing the nation’s system of immigration control
if they are not dealt with effectively.”); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER,
(July
14,
2019,
9:45
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1150400995177959427
[https://perma.cc/Z45L-XL6F] (“The adult single men areas were clean but crowded – also
loaded up with a big percentage of criminals……”).
See CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, supra note 138.
139

942

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:4

inhumane conditions, condemned by human rights organizations, 140 the
United Nations, 141 and even the United States government itself. 142
CBP facilities maintain temporary detention facilities to hold migrants
who are arriving to the United States without proper documentation. 143
Border patrol agents and these facilities are often a migrant’s first encounter
with the United States government. 144 CBP facilities are meant for short-term
detention, typically no longer than seventy-two hours, while the migrants
undergo initial processing and are transferred to the custody of another
agency. 145 However, before these migrants can be released into the custody
of other agencies, such as ICE or the Department of Health and Human
Services, there must be space available at those agencies’ facilities. 146 Yet, as
the acting inspector general of the DHS has pointed out, “because both ICE
and [Health and Human Services] are operating at or above capacity, CBP
has experienced increasing instances of prolonged detention in its
facilities.” 147
As these short-term facilities are now being used for long-term
detention, some children and families have experienced limited access to a
change of clothes and do not have access to showers or hot meals. 148 At adult
See The Nightmarish Detention of U.S. Immigrants, AMNESTY INT’L (last visited Oct. 14,
2019),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/the-nightmarish-detention-of-us-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/4H8F-Y8H6] (“Investigative news reports have exposed a litany of human
rights abuses in the detention facilities . . . . Amnesty International has launched a campaign
to pressure our government to honor its human rights obligations. . . . The time has come
for the U.S. government to apply the rule of law to those within its own borders.”); Human
Rights Watch, US: Substandard Medical Care in Immigration Detention, YOUTUBE (May
7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6a3t61tffI [https://perma.cc/73YV-AMAE].
See Deanna Paul & Nick Miroff, U.N. Human Rights Chief ‘Deeply Shocked’ by Migrant
Detention Center Conditions in Texas, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2019/07/08/un-human-rights-chief-deeplyshocked-by-migrant-detention-center-conditions-texas/
[https://perma.cc/4NZN-TS24]
(“The high commissioner singled out the treatment of migrant children, saying she was
‘deeply shocked that children are forced to sleep on the floor in overcrowded facilities,
without access to adequate healthcare or food, and with poor sanitation conditions.’”).
See generally JENNIFER L. COSTELLO, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., MANAGEMENT ALERT—DHS NEEDS TO ADDRESS DANGEROUS OVERCROWDING AND
PROLONGED DETENTION OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY
(REDACTED) (July 2, 2019).
Id. at 3.
See CBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics [https://perma.cc/D2LDJBJY] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
COSTELLO, supra note 142, at 3 n.5.
Id. at 3.
140

141

142
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144

145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 6.
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facilities, the inspector general found that some detainees were held in
confinement that allowed for standing room only, sometimes for a week. 149
Further, some adults did not have access to a shower for as long as a month,
and were instead given “wet-wipes to maintain personal hygiene.” 150
Additionally, meals provided to single adults did not take into consideration
any dietary restrictions and many had been fed only bologna sandwiches,
leading to digestive issues. 151
The conditions at ICE detention centers, which are meant for longer
lengths of stay, have also been heavily criticized. 152 Starting at intake, some
detention centers required a strip search of all detainees, in violation of the
standards set by ICE, which require “‘reasonable suspicion’ based on
‘specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe
that a specific detainee is in possession of contraband.’” 153 Furthermore, the
center in question was not documenting these strip searches, making it
impossible to determine whether the strip search was warranted upon
review. 154 Detainees reported delayed medical care, even for painful
conditions, “such as infected teeth and a knee injury.” 155 During inspections,
some facilities were observed to have mold in the bathrooms, no hot water,
and leaking pipes. 156 Hygienic supplies were in limited supply, and in some
instances, detainees “were advised to purchase more at the facility
commissary.” 157 Food appeared spoiled, and standard food handling
procedures were not followed. 158 There are also reports of detainees held in
solitary confinement for as much as twenty-two hours a day, for days or
weeks at a time. 159

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
See generally KELLY, supra note 126.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8 (“We observed spoiled, wilted, and moldy produce and other food in kitchen

refrigerators, as well as food past its expiration date. We also found expired frozen food,
including meat, and thawing meat without labels indicating when it had begun thawing or the
date by which it must be used. Finally, at one facility, we observed food service workers not
wearing required nets to cover facial hair to ensure food safety.”).
Maryam Saleh & Spencer Woodman, A Homeland Security Whistleblower Goes Public
About ICE Abuse of Solitary Confinement, THE INTERCEPT (May 20, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/05/21/ice-solitary-confinement-whistleblower/
[https://perma.cc/5KBJ-DFAH].
159
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To make matters worse, detainees who complained about conditions
at some facilities were retaliated against, and in facilities operated by private
corporations, detainees had limited contact with ICE officers to whom they
could report their concerns. 160 In alleging mistreatment by guards, improper
discipline, 161 or even just poor living conditions, detainees have little
recourse if there is not a proper procedure for handling these complaints.
Federal employees who reported maltreatment in detention centers faced
silence, isolation, and bureaucratic red tape. 162
III. ANALYSIS
Until immigration policies that emphasize deterrence and detention
are changed, the number of immigrant detainees will likely continue to
grow. With large government contracts at stake, the corporations that run
these detention centers will continue to lobby for punitive measures for the
undocumented. 163 In 2018, GEO Group and CoreCivic, Inc, the two largest
players in the private prison industry, spent over $4 million on political
contributions and lobbying efforts. 164 Their substantial political power has
led to a lack of transparency and accountability, requiring substantial
reform.

KELLY, supra note 126, at 5.
Id. at 6 (“Staff did not always tell detainees why they were being segregated, nor did they
always communicate detainees’ rights in writing or provide appeal forms for those put in
punitive lock-down or placed in segregation. . . . [O]ne detainee reported being locked down
for multiple days for sharing coffee with another detainee.”).
See Saleh & Woodman, supra note 159.
While lobbying efforts focus on the detaining “illegal immigrants,” there are multiple
reports of lawful permanent residents and even United States citizens winding up in
immigration detention. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re An American, But What If
You Had to Prove It Or Be Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/22/504031635/you-say-you-re-anamerican-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-or-be-deported [https://perma.cc/9WS7-T6D7];
Brittny Mejia, It’s Not Just People In the U.S. Illegally—ICE Is Nabbing Lawful Permanent
Residents Too, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnlawful-resident-20180628-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Q97B-TU4C].
Yuki Noguchi, Under Siege and Largely Secret: Business That Serve Immigration
Detention, NPR (June 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/30/736940431/under-siegeand-largely-secret-businesses-that-serve-immigration-detention
[https://perma.cc/E7DHJPR8].
160
161

162
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A. Current Oversight Mechanisms & Standards
Of the 211 immigrant detention facilities, only five are directly owned
and operated by ICE. 165 ICE maintains that “[t]hrough a robust inspections
program, ICE ensures detention facilities used to house ICE detainees do
so in accordance with ICE national detention standards.” 166 However, these
standards may differ depending on whether the facility is operated by ICE
or by a private corporation. 167 Incentivized by shareholders to maximize
profit, private corporations have and will continue to negotiate for the least
costly standards to apply. 168 As such, detainees in those facilities will be
subjected to noticeably worse living conditions. Furthermore, “twenty-two
percent of immigrant detention centers are smaller detention centers which
were permitted to conduct their own inspections, known as Organizational
Review Self-Assessments,” 169 reducing the impact of any incentive to
maintain habitable conditions, let alone conditions that live up to the
standards set by ICE.
An in-depth analysis of the differences of these negotiated standards is
beyond the scope of this article. It is important to illustrate, however, how
different the standards are. The least stringent of the federal detention
standards utilized by ICE and the private corporations contracted to operate
ICE detention facilities is the 2000 National Detention Standards (2000
NDS). 170 As of 2018, twenty-four percent of immigrant detainees are held in
facilities that are inspected according to this standard. 171 The Pests and
Vermin provision of these standards is a useful comparison. The 2000 NDS
required facilities to bring in “licensed pest-control professionals to perform
monthly inspections” to “identify and eradicate rodents, insects, and

JOHN V. KELLY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE DOES NOT
FULLY USE CONTRACTING TOOLS TO HOLD DETENTION FACILITY CONTRACTORS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR FAILING TO MEET PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 3 (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/OIG-19-18-Jan19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28SQ-ESRZ].
Facility Inspections, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Feb. 18, 2020)
https://www.ice.gov/facility-inspections [https://perma.cc/WJ8W-5TEX].
Id. (“Depending on the negotiated contract or agreement, detention facilities that house
ICE adult detainees operate under one of three sets of ICE detention standards.”).
See Investor Relations, CORECIVIC, INC., http://ir.corecivic.com/
[https://perma.cc/2P6B-K2NA] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (“[CoreCivic, Inc.] is a diversified
government solutions company with the scale and experience needed to solve tough
government challenges in cost-effective ways.”).
See Cullen, supra note 131, at ¶ 6.
165

166

167

168

169
170
171

Id.
Id.
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vermin.” 172 These standards also required “a preventative spraying program
for indigenous insects.” 173
In 2008, ICE sought to revise its detention standards, and “in
coordination with agency stakeholders,” released the 2008 PerformanceBased National Detention Standards (“2008 PBNDS”). 174 Thirteen percent
of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities that are inspected under this
standard. 175 The Pests and Vermin provision of the 2008 PBNDS improved
slightly since the 2000 NDS, requiring a “provision for callback services as
necessary,” in addition to the monthly inspections and preventative
spraying. 176 A similar provision is incorporated into the Family Residential
Standards released by ICE in 2007. 177
ICE revised its standards yet again in 2011, this time “incorporat[ing]
the input of many agency employees and stakeholders, including the
perspectives of nongovernmental organizations and ICE field offices.” 178 In
2016, ICE further revised this iteration of the detention standards to remain
in line with federal laws and regulations. 179 These standards are considered
the most stringent standards applicable to immigration detention facilities 180
as sixty-three percent of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities held to
these standards. 181 As for the prevention of pests and vermin after these
revisions, the 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards now
also require that “[d]oors to the outside should be tight fitting and door

2000 Detention Operations Manual, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 9 (Sept. 20, 2000),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/envirom.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AWH5-2YJF].

172

173
174

Id.
2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S.

IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) https://www.ice.gov/detentionstandards/2008 [https://perma.cc/59NR-4U2V].
See Cullen, supra note 131.
2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 4 (Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detentionstandards/pdf/environmental_health_and_safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3Z9-F3EK].
Family Residential Standards, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 18 (Dec. 21, 2007),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/familyresidential/pdf/rs_environmental_health_andZ_safety.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S2J-L3HA].
2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (last updated Dec. 18, 2019) https://www.ice.gov/detentionstandards/2011 [https://perma.cc/C4M9-RUUG].
175
176

177

178

179
180
181

Id.
See Cullen, supra note 131.
Id.
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sweeps should be installed.” 182 Such a requirement may require renovation
of facilities, making it unlikely for private prison companies to agree to such
standards when there are lesser standards considered acceptable to ICE.

1. Use of Inspection Waivers
Detention facility compliance with contracted standards is monitored
through Office of Detention Oversight inspections, Nakamoto Group, Inc.
inspections, and Custody Management’s Detention Service Manager
inspections. 183 If it is determined that a facility is deficient in some way, the
Custody Management division of the Enforcement and Removal
Operations office will typically work with the facility to determine a plan to
correct the deficiency. 184 However, the DHS’s Office of Inspector General
found that this process is ineffective in holding facility contractors
accountable. 185 For example, during the inspection process, “a facility can
assert that it could not remedy the deficiency because complying with the
standard can create a hardship, because of a conflict with a state law or a
local policy, a facility design limitation, or another reason” and apply for a
waiver to Custody Management. 186
Even with this limited guidance, the DHS Office of Inspector General
found that “ICE has no formal policies and procedures to govern the waiver
process and has allowed ERO officials without clear authority to grant
waivers.” 187 Between September 2016 and July 2018, ninety-six percent of
these waiver requests were approved, “including waivers of safety and
security standards.” 188 Further, it was found that waivers rarely had an
expiration date, allowing facilities to circumvent detention standards
indefinitely. 189 One of the most egregious waivers ICE granted allowed a
contracted facility to use a tear gas that was ten times more toxic than the
pepper spray allowed by the contracted standard. 190 The conclusion of the
DHS Office of Inspector General report gave ICE multiple
2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-Based National Detention Standards, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T 21 (revised Dec. 2016), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionstandards/2011/1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/88AX-X7D7].
See KELLY, supra note 165, at 5–6.
See id. at 5, 9.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
182

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. (“Custody Management granted a waiver authorizing a facility (a CDF [Contract

Detention Facility]) to use 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS gas) instead of the OC (pepper)
spray authorized by the detention standard.”).
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recommendations to increase compliance in these contracted facilities,
including imposing financial penalties for failure to maintain standards,
finalizing a procedure for waiver approval, and increasing the number of
contracting officers’ representatives who oversee day-to-day operations at
these facilities. 191 ICE appeared receptive to the recommendations, but DHS
Office of Inspector General declined to close any of its recommendations
until further steps were taken by ICE to improve compliance and
oversight. 192

2. Flores Settlement
The Flores Settlement Agreement (Flores Settlement) was signed in
1997 and arose out of a class action lawsuit brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union on behalf of immigrant children who were detained by the
INS. 193 The lawsuit sought to change INS’s treatment of children in
detention and the timing of their release from detention. 194 Some groups
argue that the Flores Settlement created a “loophole” in our immigration
laws, loosening asylum rules and driving up the number of “apprehended
aliens who claim credible fear (the first step in applying for asylum) . . . up
over 10-fold from a decade ago.” 195 The Flores Settlement, however, focuses
almost exclusively on the conditions of detention facilities in which children
are held, the care they should receive there, and when and to whom they
should be released. 196 The Flores Settlement was meant to be a temporary
solution to give time for legacy INS, and later the DHS, to pass final
regulations relating to juvenile immigrant detention. 197 To this day, the Flores
Settlement remains the basis for juvenile detention standards, but lacks

Id. at 15.
Id. at 18–20. ICE’s response to each recommendation by DHS OIG was that it “concurred
with the recommendation.” Id.
See Rebeca M. López, Codifying the Flores Settlement Agreement: Seeking to Protect
Immigrant Children in U.S. Custody, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1635, 1648 (2012).
Id. at 1648–49.
See Matthew Sussis, The History of the Flores Settlement: How a 1997 Agreement
Cracked Open Our Detention Laws, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDIES (Feb. 11, 2019),
191
192

193

194
195

https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement [https://perma.cc/42KJ-SX5D].
See Abbie Gruwell, Unaccompanied Minors and the Flores Settlement: What to Know,
NCSL:
THE
NCSL
BLOG
(Oct.
30,
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/30/unaccompanied-minors-and-the-flores-settlementagreement-what-to-know.aspx [https://perma.cc/UT34-9H28].
See López, supra note 193, at 1650.
196

197
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enforcement mechanisms and is at substantial risk of being terminated
altogether. 198
The Trump administration proposed ending the Flores Settlement as
a way to keep immigrant families together in detention. 199 Arguing that,
because Flores requires that children must be released after twenty days in
detention, DHS must separate families, releasing the children while parents
or other family members stay in custody, in order to comply with the terms
of the agreement. 200 There are, of course, other options the administration
could and should consider, like releasing the family unit as a whole on
parole or supervised release, for example. Indeed, the practice of
conducting initial credible fear screening and releasing family units from
detention within twenty days has been used successfully since 2015, with
over ninety percent of families complying with ICE check-in appointments
and attendance at court hearings after their release from detention. 201 Pulling
out of the Flores Settlement altogether would likely result in children
needlessly being held in custody indefinitely in unsafe and unsanitary
conditions with little, if any, recreational or educational programs, risking
severe mental and physical harm to these children as a result. 202 As the Flores
Settlement has not yet been codified, the risk of an anti-immigrant
administration withdrawing from the agreement remains. 203

B. Proposed Oversight Mechanisms
Immigration reform has been a long-standing bipartisan goal, but
exactly what “immigration reform” means differs widely between the

See id. at 1661; Katie Reilly & Madeleine Carlisle, The Trump Administration’s Move to
End Rule Limiting Detention of Migrant Children Rejected in Court, TIME (Sept. 30, 2019),

198

https://time.com/5657381/trump-administration-flores-agreement-migrant-children/
[https://perma.cc/6HGG-DFSM].
199
200

Id.
Id. Regardless of these proposed rule changes, any changes to the Flores Settlement,

including through regulation, would have to be approved by Judge Dolly Gee, the overseer
of the settlement. See Maria Sacchetti, Federal Judge Blocks Trump Administration from
Detaining Migrant Children for Indefinite Periods, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/federal-judge-blocks-trump-administrationfrom-detaining-migrant-children-for-indefinite-periods/2019/09/27/49a39790-e15f-11e9b199-f638bf2c340f_story.html [https://perma.cc/J4HH-EK5S].
Fast Check: Asylum Seekers Regularly Attend Immigration Court Hearings, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/fact-check-asylumseekers-regularly-attend-immigration-court-hearings [https://perma.cc/7FQW-RPKY].
See Reilly & Carlisle, supra note 198.
López, supra note 193.
201

202
203
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parties. 204 Those on the right would place enforcement of current
immigration laws higher on the priority list, which would include an
expansion of border security and increasing exclusions and deportations. 205
Those on the left would like to see a focus on creating a “path to citizenship”
for undocumented immigrants currently in the United States, clearing the
wait list of visa applicants, and deporting only those who have committed
criminal offenses. 206 These differences in priorities make comprehensive
immigration reform difficult to negotiate and implement and ultimately
leads to the question: Are there reforms that are politically feasible, in that
they do not touch directly on immigration, but that would, in effect, reform
our immigration policies?

1. Whistleblower and Anti-Retaliation Law Reform
Whistleblowing is an important and underutilized mechanism of
reform, both in the private and public sector. 207 In the article, Combating

Corruption: The Development of Whistleblowing Laws in the United
States, Europe, and Armenia, authors David Schultz and Khachik
Harutyunyan point to four main justifications for whistleblowing. 208
Generally, these justifications boil down to exposing bad behavior,
reforming entire organizations, and seeking justice by exposing wrongdoers
and holding them accountable. 209 Despite protections, however,

See Theresa Cardinal Brown, Getting to Enactment: The Political Obstacles to
Immigration
Reform,
BIPARTISAN
POLICY
CENTER
(Oct.
21,
2016),
204

https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/political-obstacles-to-immigration-reform/
[https://perma.cc/W83D-ST6C].

Id.
Id.
See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 183, 199 (2007); Daniel Van Schooten, Gov’t
Watchdog Finds Flaws in Implementation of Contractor Whistleblower Law, PROJECT ON
205
206
207

GOV. OVERSIGHT (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2017/03/govt-watchdogfinds-flaws-in-implementation-of-contractor-whistleblower-law/
[https://perma.cc/NAP5XCG9].
David Schultz & Khachik Harutyunyan, Combating Corruption: The Development of
Whistleblowing Laws in the United States, Europe, and Armenia, 1 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 87,
88
(Dec.
2015),
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S2351667415000141?token=9925E3D4C213B97
4A6F07B809C42B6C67F7A294161B8B51833C4E646D0A4351EAF88CADA8A1004FE
FE785F374F15415D [https://perma.cc/U98S-KSK9].
208

209

Id.
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whistleblowers are often afraid to come forward, fearing adverse
employment consequences or hostility from their co-workers. 210
For employees of the federal government, whistleblowers are
protected by the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). 211 To
succeed with a whistleblower reprisal claim under the WPA, the employee
must show that he or she made a protected disclosure, the disclosure was a
contributing factor in a personnel action, and that the person who made the
personnel action had knowledge of the disclosure. 212 If the employee is
successful in meeting this burden, the agency can still avoid liability if it can
show by clear and convincing evidence that the personnel action would have
been taken regardless of the protected disclosure. 213 This statute does not
apply, however, to employees of federal contractors. 214
In 2016, Congress passed legislation that many lauded as a substantial
expansion of federal whistleblower law by broadening permanent protection
to employees of federal contractors. 215 It also provided a private right of
action in the event of retaliation against whistleblowers but charging
employees must first exhaust all administrative remedies available to them
under the statute before an action may be brought against the contractor in
federal court. 216 Furthermore, employees are only protected from reprisal
for disclosing information that the employee:

Starting in October 2019, similar hostility has been directed at a federal government
whistleblower by the President of the United States. Despite following the procedure as
required by the statute, this anonymous whistleblower is experiencing significant pressure for
their good faith effort to expose what many consider to be blatant corruption. See Dennis
Wagner, Trump’s Allies Want to ID the Whistleblower, Who May Learn the Price of
Speaking
Out,
USA
TODAY
(Nov.
6,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/11/06/impeachment-federalwhistleblowers-face-retaliation-abuse/2497666001/ [https://perma.cc/T4ZD-MHK4].
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
Id.; see also Mark P. Cohen & John J. Lapin, The United States of America: Federal
Whistleblower Protection, COMMITTING TO EFFECTIVE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION,
OECD 203 (Mar. 16, 2016), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/committing-toeffective-whistleblower-protection_9789264252639-en#page201 [https://perma.cc/XP6KJCSX#page201].
See Cohen & Lapin, supra note 212, at 203–04.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
See 41 U.S.C. § 4712; Anna C. Haac, Federal Contractor Whistleblowers Now
Permanently Protected from Retaliation, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-contractor-whistleblowers-now-permanentlyprotected-retaliation [https://perma.cc/EWR9-7NGP]. Congress initially passed this law in
2013 as a temporary pilot program that was to last four years. Act of Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat.
1632, 1837–41 (2013). The 2016 legislation made this permanent.
41 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(2).
210

211
212

213
214
215
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reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a
Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse
of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law,
rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract . . . or grant. 217
As evidenced by the proposed Whistleblower Act of 2019, 218 it is
unclear whether the 2016 legislation includes protections for subcontractors
and subgrantees. 219
The United States Office of Special Counsel, the agency with
jurisdiction over whistleblower complaints from federal employees, typically
releases such complaints and related agency reports when the cases have
been closed. 220 The Office of Special Counsel does not, however, handle
complaints by employees of federal contractors. 221 Employees of federal
contractors must instead make their “complaint to the Inspector General of
the executive agency involved.” 222 The Inspector General is only required to
investigate if it finds that the complaint is not frivolous and reports
misconduct that meets the standard under the statute, and the employee’s
complaint must not have been previously addressed. 223 Since 2017, there has
only been one investigative report released by the DHS relating to
immigration functions within the department. 224
41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1). “The term ‘abuse of authority’ means an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority that is inconsistent with the mission of the executive agency concerned
or the successful performance of a contract or grant of such agency.” 41 U.S.C. § 4712(g)(1).
S. 2315, 116th Cong. (2019).

217

218
219

Id.

Office of Special Counsel, Know Your Rights When Reporting Wrongs (rev. Mar. 2019),
https://osc.gov/Documents/Outreach%20and%20Training/Handouts/Know%20Your%20R
ights%20When%20Reporting%20Wrongs%20Handout.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQC3CKWQ]. After initially disclosing the alleged wrongdoing, the Office of Special Counsel will
interview the employee and evaluate the information to determine whether it is “substantially
likely” that the complaint can be proven and whether it constitutes a severe enough violation
of law or mismanagement to require the agency to investigate. If so, the agency will have to
submit a report after an investigation, and the employee will then have an opportunity to
respond. The report and comments are then sent to the President and Congress before being
released to the public. Id.
See 41 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(1).
220

221

Id.
Id.
See Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Whistleblower
Retaliation
Reports
of
Investigation
(Sept.
24,
2019),

222
223
224

https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/whistleblower-retaliation-reports-of-investigation
[https://perma.cc/LCS6-9RWE]. The report discussed allegations made by a Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP) officer of racial profiling by CBP at the Port of Detroit. The
complainant alleged that black Americans were more likely to be stopped and searched at
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In addition to federal laws, states have enacted whistleblower
protections with varying degrees of breadth and effectiveness. An analysis of
every state whistleblower retaliation statute is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is important to note their potential impact in Texas, the state
with, by and large, the highest population of immigrant detainees. 225 This
article also looks to the Minnesota Whistleblower Act as a potential model
for federal reform.

a. Texas
For the fiscal year of 2018, Texas held almost 16,000 immigrants in
detention each day. 226 Comparatively, the state with the next highest number
of immigrants in detention per day was California, at 6,527 detainees. 227
Many of the recent reports of unsanitary and inhumane conditions have
come out of these Texas facilities, some operated by CBP and others
operated by GEO Group and CoreCivic, Inc. 228 With the relatively narrow
whistleblower protections for federal employees 229 and employees of federal
the border, even after informing CBP officers they approached the border in error. After
reporting this to his supervisors, a letter of reprimand was placed in his file. The Office of
the Inspector General concluded that this was in fact a violation of the Whistleblower
Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Whistleblower Retaliation Report of Investigation, Office
of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, No. I16-CBP-DET-17715 (Sept.
29, 2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/whistleblower-retaliation-reports-of-investigation
[https://perma.cc/LCS6-9RWE].
Detention
by
the
numbers,
FREEDOM
FOR
IMMIGRANTS
,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/2J23-LU9D]
(last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
225

226
227
228

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Martin Garbus, What I Saw at the Dilley, Texas, Immigrant Detention Center,

THE NATION (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/dilley-texas-immigrationdetention/ [https://perma.cc/6FQU-NBC6]; Amanda Holpuch, Migrant Children Held in
Texas Facility Need Access to Doctors, Says Attorney, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/08/migrant-children-detention-center-texasattorney-health-crisis [https://perma.cc/AC5D-H263]; Maria Sacchetti, ICE’s Chief Called
Family Detention “Summer Camp.” Here’s What it Looks Like Inside., THE TEX. TRIBUNE
(Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/08/25/inside-ice-family-detentionfacility-texas/ [https://perma.cc/6D3C-N6Y4].
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302 et seq. (“Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to authority . . .
take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any
employee or applicant for employment because of . . . any disclosure of information by an
employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences . . .
any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such
229
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contractors under federal law, 230 such employees may instead try to look to
state statutes in the event of retaliation after what they considered to be a
protected report. Unfortunately, Texas’ whistleblower protections provide
no additional recourse than that provided by federal law, as they apply only
to employees of state or local governments or other public employers. 231
Furthermore, to be considered a “protected report,” it must be made
in good faith and to “an appropriate law enforcement authority.” 232 Texas
courts have held that the “good faith” test is dual prong, requiring both a
subjective and an objective component. 233 Even if the Texas Whistleblower
Act protected private employees from retaliation, it does not protect
violations of internal policy or rules not “adopted pursuant to a statute or
ordinance.” 234 Furthermore, at least in the preemption context, “federal
contracts do not qualify as ‘Laws.’” 235 As such, it is unlikely that Texas courts
would recognize a report of a violation of the standards promulgated by ICE
or the Flores Settlement and contracted out to the privately-operated
detention centers to be a protected report under Texas state law. The
inadequacies of whistleblower protection under Texas state law speak to the
necessary reform that is needed to federal whistleblower protections.

b. Minnesota and the Future of the Federal Statute
In contrast to both Texas and federal law, the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act gives much broader protections to whistleblowers. 236
Both private and public employees are protected from retaliation if they
have “report[ed] a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation of any
federal or state law or common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an
employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.” 237
disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the
conduct of foreign affairs . . . .”).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4712.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002.
230
231
232
233

Id.
See Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996) (“‘Good faith’ means that (1)

the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) the employee’s
belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.”).
Ruiz v. City of San Antonio, 966 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Privatized Detention & Immigration
Federalism,
STAN.
L.
REV.
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privatized-detention-immigration-federalism/
[https://perma.cc/E7WW-UNFW].
See generally MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subdiv. 1(1).
234
235

236
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While, like the Texas Whistleblower Act, the MWA does require the
report to be made in good faith. However, the Minnesota legislature has
defined “good faith” much differently than Texas courts. 238 In Minnesota, a
good faith report merely requires that the report not violate subdivision
three of the MWA, which states, “This section does not permit an employee
to make statements or disclosures knowing that they are false or that they
are in reckless disregard of the truth.” 239 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
further clarified this definition by not requiring that the “putative
whistleblower act with the purpose of exposing an illegality.” 240
Compared to the Texas Whistleblower Act and federal whistleblower
statutes, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act goes the furthest to protect
individuals who are looking to hold the organizations for which they work
accountable, while still protecting the organizations themselves from
lawsuits based on frivolous or false reports. Some—likely including those
who passed the Texas whistleblower statute—would argue that the creation
of broad governmental protections for those who are outing wrongdoing at
private corporations is an unacceptable expansion of governmental power. 241
However, as government and the private sector continue to comingle
through contractual relationships and lobbying efforts, it is important to
ensure the public’s tax dollars are spent by those private entities in a way
that aligns with our nation’s values and complies with applicable law. In
addition to the accountability that is encouraged through governmental
oversight, the individuals who work in those private corporations every day
have intimate knowledge of day-to-day operations and can provide firsthand
insight into any wrongdoing.
The federal definition of the severity of the reported violation for the
report to be protected must also be clarified and expanded. The statute
currently requires that the violation must be “gross” or the public risk must
be “substantial and specific.” 242 With such a high bar, even among
employees who witness severe violations that may rise to this level, few are
likely to report wrongdoing for fear of retaliatory acts that have no recourse
under the statute. Further, employees who witness minor violations will
Compare MINN. STAT. § 181.931, subdiv. 4 with Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779,
784 (Tex. 1996).
MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subdiv. 3.
Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. 2017).
See Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending
a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1652 (2008)
(“Another argument occasionally used to justify an external reporting requirement is that the
employer-employee relationship is private and should thus be beyond the purview of the
judicial system.”).
See 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1).
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likely refrain from making a report immediately, opting instead to wait until
the violation rises to the level of severity defined by the statute, at which
point, substantial damage may have been done to the persons affected by
such wrongdoing. As seen in almost all fields, from healthcare to software
development, prevention and early detection cost significantly less than
reactive measures taken to correct the problem. 243 Here, the costs involve
human life and dignity, making it even more crucial that we take proactive
measures to prevent and quickly correct violations of basic rights.
The Minnesota Whistleblower Act’s definition of a protected report
could be adopted at the federal level, in order to encourage the prevention
and early detection of wrongdoing at the hands of federal contractors.
Reports of even suspected violations of rules or laws, including common
law, would encourage these contractors to enact and enforce the standards
that we have asked of them and that they have agreed to. Until these
standards are codified and with the proposed protections, employees could
report violations of contracted standards under a breach of contract
theory. 244 Enhancing whistleblower protections is just one step towards
reform of immigrant detention centers. Uniform standards should also be
enacted nationwide, along with increased unannounced inspections, as
proposed in the Dignity for Detained Immigrants Act of 2019. 245 Enacting
policies that encourage alternatives to detention would decrease the
detained population and prevent overcrowding at detention facilities. Until
that can occur, we must protect whistleblowers who help expose the
See, e.g., Bill Frist & Alice Rivlin, The Power of Prevention, U.S. NEWS (May 28, 2015),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/2015/05/28/focus-on-prevention-to-cutus-health-care-costs [https://perma.cc/RE2H-DTK9] (“Prevention can reduce the risk factors
that lead to chronic diseases, slow their progression, improve overall health and reduce
health care spending.”); Matt Warcholinski, The Cost of Quality in Software Development—
Is the Quality Worth It?, BRAINHUB, https://brainhub.eu/blog/cost-of-quality-in-softwaredevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/4SPT-HQD9] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (“[I]n software
development quality should be planned and implemented, not inspected afterwards. The
reason is in clear sight—the cost of preventing errors is less than the cost of correcting errors
found on final stages or by customer complaints.”).
See Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 204–05 (Minn. 2000) (holding
whistleblower reports must implicate a violation of federal or state law), superseded by
statute, Minnesota Whistleblower Act, H.F. 542, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013), as
recognized in Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC, 900 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.
2017) (holding that the MWA does not require the whistleblower to “act with the purpose
of exposing an illegality”).
116 H.R. 2415, 116th Cong. (2019). This Act would require “the Secretary of Homeland
Security [to], by rulemaking, establish detention standards for each facility at which aliens in
the custody of the Department of Homeland Security are detained.” Id. at § 2. Furthermore,
this Act would require yearly, unannounced inspections at every facility to ensure compliance
with DHS’s standards. Id. at § 3.
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corruption and abuse that has become commonplace in immigrant
detention.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, rates of immigrant detention in the United States
would fall to a level at which private prison companies are no longer needed
and public detention centers are used only sparingly. Opting for alternatives
to detention, such as release on recognizance, bond, or monitoring
programs, 246 and repealing IIRAIRA’s mandatory detention provision would
likely get us to that point. As for the former, the DHS merely needs to
change its policies. However, under the current administration, that is
improbable. 247 As for the latter, it is unlikely that any substantial immigration
reform will occur anytime soon. In the meantime, proper oversight in
immigrant detention centers, both public and private, is crucial to ensure
detainees receive proper care. Expanding whistleblower protections on a
federal level would benefit not only the immigrants in detention centers but
would also promote transparency and efficiency. In turn, this would lead to
better decision making and reduce corruption at all levels of government.

These options cost less to the American taxpayer, but most importantly, are far more
humane. ACLU, Alternatives to Immigration Detention: Less Costly and More Human than
Federal
Lock-up,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_atd_fact_sheet_final_v.2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VFT8-8F58] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
See generally Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 7.
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